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Observers have relied increasingly on simple reaction functions, such as the Taylor rule, to assess the 
conduct of monetary policy. Applying this approach to deflationary or near-zero inflation environments is 
problematic, however, and this paper examines two shortcomings of particular relevance to the Japanese 
case of the last decade. One is the unusually high degree of uncertainty associated with potential output 
in an environment of prolonged stagnation and deflation. Consequently, reaction function–based 
assessments of Japanese monetary policy are so sensitive to the chosen gauge of potential output as to be 
unreliable. The second shortcoming is the neglect of policy expectations, which become critically 
important as nominal interest rates approach zero. Using long-term bond yields, we identify five episodes 
since 1996 characterized by abrupt declines in Japanese inflation expectations. Policies undertaken by 
the Bank of Japan during this period did little to stabilize expectations, and the August 2000 interest rate 
increase appears to have intensified deflationary concerns. 
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THE TROUBLE WITH TAYLOR RULES IN LOW-INFLATION ENVIRONMENTS 
Monetary policy must be evaluated, both by those conducting the policy and by those in markets and in 
the political realm holding it accountable. In recent years, the academic literature as well as the financial 
press and pundits have relied increasingly on simple monetary policy reaction functions, such as the 
eponymous rule of John B. Taylor (1993), to make that assessment.
1 Using (seemingly) readily available 
data and requiring little or no estimation, an analyst using a Taylor (or similar) rule can give a simple yes 
or no answer to the question of whether policy at a given moment is too tight or too loose. For academics, 
Taylor-like reaction functions are appealing to the extent that they can be interpreted as reasonable 
approximations to the optimal instrument rules derived from simple, micro-founded macro models.
2  
As with most current forms of comfort in macroeconomics, however, Taylor rule analysis 
becomes problematic when confronting a low-inflation environment and particularly when facing the 
experience of Japan’s Great Recession. Many commentators have focused on the obvious difficulty that 
when the central bank’s nominal instrument interest rate nears zero, it is impossible to evaluate actual 
policy measures by means of a Taylor rule that might suggest negative instrument interest rates.
3 But this 
self-evident concern is misplaced in at least two ways. First, even when the instrument interest rate is 
zero, the same theoretical approaches that underlie Taylor rule analysis imply that a credible commitment 
to a future course of interest rates should have the same effect as a movement in the interest rate today.
4 
Thus, the issue for monetary policy assessment when interest rates near zero becomes how to discern 
whether such a commitment exists and is believed by the market and households.  
Second, even if there is sufficient room left in nominal interest rates to make an assessment based 
on some version of a Taylor rule, uncertainty over the potential rate of growth in the economy is likely to 
rise as inflation approaches zero. This is both a statistical artifact, a result of the econometric methods 
employed to make most “top-down” estimates of potential output, and a substantive difficulty, reflecting 
                                                           
1 The Taylor rule is a formula designed to provide recommendations for how a central bank should set short-term 
interest rates as economic conditions change.  Specifically, the rule states that the real short-term interest rate should 
be determined according to three factors: (1) where actual inflation is relative to the targeted level that the central 
bank wishes to achieve, (2) how far economic activity is above or below its "full employment" level, and (3) what 
the level of the short-term interest rate is that would be consistent with full employment.  For more details, see 
www.frbsf.org/education/activities/drecon/9803.html. 
2 See Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Goodfriend and King (2001), and Giannoni and Woodford (2003) for the 
canonical and widely cited examples of tractable new Keynesian/classical models that yield Taylor rule–like 
reaction functions from theoretically appealing underlying assumptions. 
3 Taylor himself acknowledged this issue, arguing instead for money supply rules in a deflationary environment 
(Taylor 1997). Nonetheless, Taylor (2001) presents an assessment of BoJ policy using a conventional Taylor rule. 
4 Or, to put it another way, the Taylor rule–like reaction functions are typically derived in the context of a 
discretionary monetary policy, while the gains from policy commitment become large when the policy rate is 
constrained by the zero lower bound. Absent such a commitment, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) show that it may  
  3
the difficulty of distinguishing between structural change and deficient aggregate demand in times of 
financial distress (almost inevitably coincident with low-inflation/deflationary periods). The Taylor rule 
assessment depends upon an estimate of potential output to such a degree that its results are extremely 
fragile to variation or uncertainty about this estimate, contrary to the usual blithe assumption that potential 
output is known with certainty. 
Both of these issues played critical roles in the debate over what happened in Japan over the last 
decade and particularly in the assessment of monetary policy there. In the early part of the Great 
Recession, from 1992 to 1998, differing assessments of the downturn’s severity between various Japanese 
government agencies and the market, based on differing estimates of potential growth, determined the 
relative willingness to undertake countercyclical macroeconomic stimulus.
5 The Bank of Japan (BoJ), 
though lacking legal independence until April 1998, participated in these debates and had to make its 
monetary policy judgments on the basis of some estimate of the output gap (or a similar measure of 
economic slack). From the time that the zero nominal interest rate bound was approached in early 1998, 
however, the BoJ was confronted by the need to undertake a policy of quantitative measures and to 
consider purchases of “unconventional” assets in order to pursue its policy goals. Thus, the difficulty in 
assessment of monetary policy became one of whether the BoJ’s actions constituted a credible 
commitment to a future path of interest rates and then whether that commitment was having the desired 
effect.  
Admittedly, Japan’s descent into and then persistence of deflation is a particularly difficult case 
for discerning whether or not monetary policy is too tight. It is through such difficult cases, however, that 
the limitations of Taylor rule assessments of monetary policy are most clearly illustrated. Therefore, we 
have undertaken this study to demonstrate the difficulties of discerning whether monetary policy was too 
tight in Japan during the Great Recession, at least by utilizing the reaction function approach.
6  
Proceeding chronologically if not logically, we first address the difficulties presented by 
uncertainty over potential output in Japan. We catalog the variety of approaches undertaken by previous 
investigators to estimate potential output for use in Taylor rule assessments of Japanese monetary policy 
and show the dispersion of findings that have resulted in the Taylor rule assessments. We then discuss the 
real reasons for uncertainty about Japanese potential output over this period and trace how these account 
for the major divergences in ex post evaluations of BoJ monetary policy. Turning to an assessment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be optimal for a central bank to ease policy more aggressively than it would have otherwise, in order to avoid hitting 
the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. 
5 See the discussion of demand versus supply side interpretations of Japanese stagnation in Posen (1998, chapter 2) 
and the comparison of public and private economic forecasts in Ahearne et al. (2002). 
6 The working presumption of most monetary economists is that if deflation persists, monetary policy must be too 
tight, because sufficient monetary ease must eventually raise the price level, and ongoing deflation is harmful to 
growth and financial stability. These issues are important but beyond the scope of this paper.  
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policy expectations, we propose gauging the credibility of antideflationary monetary policy by looking for 
occurrences of “deflation scares,” along the lines of Goodfriend’s (1993) analysis of “inflation scares” in 
the United States. Jointly examining a chronology of the policy measures taken by the BoJ and the 
behavior of long-term interest rates over the past several years, we conclude that the central bank’s 
actions were ineffective at preventing declines in long-term inflation expectations. 
 
WHAT IF ANYTHING DO REACTION FUNCTIONS TELL US ABOUT JAPANESE 
MONETARY POLICY IN THE GREAT RECESSION? 
 
With BoJ policy under intense scrutiny in recent years, it is no surprise that there have been many efforts 
to use reaction function analysis to assess its reaction to the onset of the recession early in the decade. 
There is little agreement among these studies, however: Some find that the BoJ was too tight over this 
period, while others suggest its reaction was appropriate, or even that the call rate was set too low. Even 
those who agree that BoJ policy went from being “too loose” in the late 1980s to “too tight” in the early 
1990s differ considerably as to exactly when the change took place. The variety of divergent assessments 
of the Japanese experience illustrates some of the pitfalls, discussed above, regarding the measurement 
problems inherent in the reaction function approach. In this section, we show that assumptions concerning 
the output gap are particularly important: Both the specification for the underlying trend in potential 
output and the use of real-time versus ex-post estimates in the analysis play a role. Whether assessments 
are made using a forward-looking specification, rather than Taylor’s original backward-looking equation, 
also makes a big difference in the appraisal. 
The Difficulty of Assessing Potential 
Table 1 summarizes some of the best known of earlier efforts to make Taylor rule–type assessments of 
Japanese monetary policy, distinguishing key features of the various methods used. There are two basic 
ways in which the method of monetary policy assessment by reaction function can be applied. In some 
applications, a reaction function is “calibrated” with standard parameter values, such as those proposed by 
Taylor (1993), and the resulting implied path of the short-term interest rate is compared with the data. 
Examples of this approach applied to Japan include McCallum (2000, 2003), Taylor (2001), and Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2002). The alternative approach is to estimate a reaction function over the relevant 
sample period and compare the estimated parameters with “reasonable” values obtained elsewhere in the 
literature. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Kuttner and Posen (2001a) are examples of this approach. 
Some studies, such as Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000) and Ahearne et al. (2002), apply both 
approaches: They estimate a reaction function over the pre-recession period and use the empirical reaction 
function from that period to assess the BoJ’s policy in a subsequent period.  
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By definition, the application of reaction functions such as the Taylor rule requires some estimate 
of potential output (or alternatively, the output gap), both because policymakers care about output 
stabilization directly and because the gap also has forecasting power for the policymakers’ other 
postulated goal—price stability. Usually overlooked is the fact that estimates of potential output are 
typically associated with a great deal of uncertainty.
7 An especially difficult complication in the case of 
Japan is how to handle the sustained decline in growth and whether it in fact represents a true break in the 
trend rate of growth sometime in the early or mid-1990s.  
By just about any measure, Japan’s economy has fallen far short of its potential since 1992. To be 
more specific about estimating potential output for use in a Taylor rule, one has to use one of two 
methodologies: top-down, which is a statistical filtering method that looks at macroeconomic time-series 
data and filters it based on limited assumptions, or bottom-up, which is constructing a growth rate from 
changes in productive factors and productivity, based on assumptions about a production function and the 
nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The top-down methods, like the latent variable 
approach of Kuttner (1992) or the commonly used Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, require that potential 
output evolve smoothly over time and that actual GDP eventually revert to potential—any sustained 
period of below potential growth, through the statistical assumption of a mean-reverting output gap, 
somewhat mechanically leads to a downward shift in the estimate of potential growth. Moreover, using 
inflation movements to help gauge the output gap can be misleading in conditions of deflation where the 
nonlinearities created by price and wage stickiness presumably become more severe. Obviously, both of 
these complications are present in the Japanese situation.  
The bottom-up method, like that used in the construction of the OECD’s estimates and in a recent 
BoJ study of potential output (Bank of Japan 2003), inevitably incorporate strong assumptions about the 
future growth of factor inputs and the returns to those inputs, both of which are endogenous. How should 
analysts looking at the Japanese situation consider the possibilities of changes in the retirement age, in the 
participation of women in the work force, or in the possibility of importing labor services? Should the 
current capital-output ratio be taken as an indicator of overinvestment in Japan or should the most recent 
capital investment, including in new technologies, be considered more productive than old bubble 
investments, raising average returns on capital? There are no easy answers to these questions. Meanwhile, 
deregulation in the energy, financial, retail, and telecommunications sectors in Japan, as well as limited 
but significant corporate restructuring, have arguably acted in the direction of raising Japanese potential 
                                                           
7 This is not the only reaction function ingredient that is subject to uncertainty, of course; another is the equilibrium 
or “natural” rate of interest, which may change as a result of shifts in trend GDP growth. Incorporating these 
additional sources of uncertainty would exacerbate the fragility problem discussed in this paper. Still, the estimate of 
potential output is probably open to the widest range of error, as will be seen in the various estimates we catalog for 
Japan.  
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output in recent years.
8 Again, even without recourse to structural slump explanations of Japan’s 
economic stagnation (e.g., Hayashi and Prescott 2000), there is a wide range of difficulties in establishing 
Japanese potential output in the period. 
Alternative Approaches, Conflicting Findings 
Table 1 summarizes along three dimensions the various methods used to construct the output gap 
estimates that underlie the application of reaction function analysis to the Japanese situation. 
(Interestingly, all of these applications use the top-down method.) The first dimension concerns 
discerning the trend itself and whether or not there has been a structural break. Approaches to this 
question include a simple linear trend as in Taylor (2001), the HP filter as in Okina and Shiratsuka (2002), 
a “kinked” trend as in McCallum (2000, 2003), and a quadratic trend as in Kuttner and Posen (2001a). 
The second dimension is the choice between a “real-time” estimate of the output gap versus an 
“ex post” measure. As first observed by Kuttner (1992) and subsequently stressed in work by Orphanides 
(2001), the real-time estimate is the relevant one for a fair evaluation of monetary policy, as it reflects the 
information actually available to policymakers at the time. None of the studies summarized in table 1 uses 
a true real time estimate of the output gap based on the unrevised data available to the BoJ at the time. 
But some, such as Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000), use “quasi-real-time” estimates derived from 
recursive estimates on revised data, thus not allowing the procedure to “peek” at data later in the sample. 
It is quite common, however, for studies to ignore this issue, and use retrospective estimates of the output 
gap, such as those derived from a full-sample HP filter, or a kinked trend with a break point determined 
ex-post, as in Okina and Shiratsuka (2002), and McCallum (2000, 2003). Ahearne et al. (2002) employ a 
hybrid method, with an ex-post estimate of potential output but real-time internal Board of Governors 
inflation forecasts. 
A third dimension along which the studies differ is on the use of a backward-looking reaction 
function, such as Taylor’s, versus a forward-looking specification like that in Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
(2000). This latter specification is more attractive, in that it makes the reasonable assumption that 
policymakers set interest rates based on their expectations of future economic developments. Also, the 
interpretation of the parameters in the forward-looking specification is cleaner, because the coefficient on 
the output gap in Taylor’s backward-looking specification may capture the inflationary implications of 
the gap, rather than a response to output per se. The studies summarized in table 1 differ in this dimension 
as well, with Taylor (2001) and McCallum (2000, 2003) using backward-looking equations, and 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Ahearne et al. (2002) using a forward-looking model. Some use both. 
Given so many differences in technique and underlying assumptions, it should come as no 
                                                           
8 See Posen (2001) and the comments by Dickens and Hall in Kuttner and Posen (2001b) for more extensive  
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surprise that the assessments of BoJ monetary policy implied by these studies, summarized in table 2, 
vary widely. Some conclude that policy was too tight over most of the 1980s and 1990s, while others 
conclude it was too loose; others find it was too tight at times and too loose at others. Still others conclude 
that policy did not deviate significantly from the path prescribed by the policy rule. Even studies based on 
a very similar methodology, such as Taylor (2001) and McCallum (2000, 2003) reach conflicting 
conclusions. This alone calls into question the usefulness of the reaction function approach. 
Why Are Reaction Functions’ Implications So Fragile? 
Having demonstrated the sensitivity of the reaction function analyses to the measurement issue problem 
highlighted earlier, it is clear that this, along with a few other elements of the specification, can 
potentially explain most of the discrepancies between the studies. To illustrate the importance of the 
measurement issue, we calculate a set of five consistently specified reaction functions varying only in 
their different measures of the output gap: three use quasi-real-time estimate, and two use retrospective 
measures (i.e., using ex post data from the whole sample not available at the time of monetary policy 
decision to generate the estimate). The first of the quasi-real-time estimates is based on a linear trend 
estimated recursively over a 40-quarter rolling window. The second is a one-sided implementation of the 
HP filter, that is, the filter applied recursively to the data up to (but not beyond) the date at which the 
policy rule is calculated.
9 The third is a one-sided version of the potential output model developed in 
Posen (1998) and Kuttner and Posen (2001b), in which inflation and output growth are used as indicators 
of unobserved potential output. The first of the two retrospective measures of potential output is the 
popular HP filter applied to the entire sample. The second is a trend with linear and quadratic terms, also 
applied to the whole sample. 
The five estimates of the output gap, displaying great variation among them, appear in figure 1. 
The key difference is between the two retrospective and the three real-time estimates: The recession, 
which started in 1991, tends to be sharper and deeper for the real-time versions. The reason is that 
retrospective measures, like the full-sample HP filter, take into account the stagnation in the 1990s in 
calculating their estimates of potential output in the 1980s, and so the later stagnation defines down the 
initial output gaps. Consequently, in the retrospective estimates, potential output growth falls off 
significantly well in advance of the business cycle peak in 1991. This can be seen quite clearly in figure 2, 
which plots the estimated growth rate of potential output for each of the five measures.
10 Not surprisingly, 
differences in the behavior of potential output implied by these specifications will turn out to account for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discussion of the difficulties of estimating Japanese potential output. 
9 The smoothing parameter is set to the conventional value of 1600. 
10 A similar difference is observed between the growth rate of the BoJ’s benchmark estimate of the output gap and 
that of the full-sample HP filter (Bank of Japan 2003, 35).  
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a great deal of the discrepancies in the reaction functions’ policy implications. 
As discussed above, the calibration approach to monetary policy assessment involves a 
comparison between the interest rate set by the central bank with that implied by a simple policy rule. 
And the simplest application of this method involves inserting current inflation and an estimate of the  
output gap into Taylor’s original equation,  
 
  ĩ t = i
* + α (yt – y
*
t) + β (πt – π
*)     (1) 
 
using the same coefficients of 1.5 on the inflation gap, (πt – π
*), and 0.5 on the output gap, (yt – y
*
t), that 
Taylor (1993) found fit the United States for the 1987–92 period. The target rate of inflation π
* is 
assumed to be 2 percent, and the intercept i
* is set to 5.0, consistent with a 3 percent equilibrium real rate 
of interest. Figure 3 depicts the policy rate target ĩ t implied by (1) for the various output gap proxies 
discussed above; nothing else differs across panels.
11 
The wide variations between the implied target interest rate paths shown in the figure illustrate 
the sensitivity of the policy prescription to the output gap measure. Some of the largest differences 
involve the discrepancies between the retrospective and real-time estimates of potential output—
especially during the onset of the recession, when the real-time measures imply sharper interest rate 
reductions than those observed in the data. For example, over 1991–92, the interest rate path associated 
with the recursively-estimated HP filter is consistently below that of the full-sample HP filter. This is a 
direct consequence of the fact that using the trend growth rate derived from the full-sample HP filter starts 
to turn down in 1989, while trend growth from the recursive HP filter remains at (or above) 4 percent 
until early 1991.
12 
A slightly more complicated application of the calibration approach involves using inflation 
and/or output forecasts in a reaction function, along the lines suggested by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(2000) (hereafter CGG). Figure 4 plots the implied interest rate paths using inflation forecasts in a CGG-
style reaction function 
 
                                                           
11 Figures 3 and 4 follow the convention in the literature of depicting the “target” interest rate rather than the fitted 
rate from an equation that also contains lagged values of the interest rate. Using lags of the realized interest rate to 
calculate fitted values would, by allowing the rule to depend on the BoJ’s past actions, make it appear, incorrectly, 
as if the rule were being followed very closely. A quasi-dynamic simulation involving lags of the fitted interest rate 
values would be more informative, and lead to conclusions similar to those derived from comparisons involving the 
“target” interest rate. 
12 Interestingly, all of these estimates of potential output, when inserted into the Taylor rule, imply a significant 
increase in the call rate in 1996–97. The BoJ’s maintenance of the call rate at 0.5 percent throughout this period 
suggests either that none of the gap measures correspond to what the BoJ was using, or that the Bank was not  
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  ĩ t = i
* + α (yt – y
*
t) + β (π
e
t – π
*)        (2) 
 
along with CGG’s benchmark parameter estimates for the United States in the Volcker-Greenspan period: 
2.15 on inflation, 0.93 on the output gap. The measure of expected inflation π
e
t used in the exercise is the 
forecast of inflation over the subsequent four quarters obtained from a regression of inflation on two lags 
of the output gap estimate and inflation. In this specification, the real-time estimates of the output gap 
imply much sharper rate reductions in the early 1990s than either of the backward-looking specifications 
or even of the retrospective output gap estimates. The main explanation for this result is simply that the 
output gap has a higher weight in this specification than in Taylor’s: both because the coefficient on the 
gap is larger and because the gap enters implicitly by way of the inflation forecast.
13 As a result, the larger 
real-time estimates of the output gap in the early 1990s imply sharper rate reductions. 
An alternative way to assess the conduct of monetary policy is to estimate a reaction function and 
compare the estimated parameters with values thought to be associated with a “reasonable” response of 
policy to economic conditions. Tables 3 and 4 present the results from estimating the backward-looking 
specification (1) and the forward-looking specification (2) for the five output gap estimates discussed 
above. Both specifications are modified to allow for a second-order partial adjustment mechanism in 
which the current call rate depends not only on the target ĩ t but also on two lags of the interest rate, 
 
  it = (1 – ρ1 – ρ2) ĩ t + ρ1 it–1 + ρ2 it–2 + et                           (3) 
 
resulting in an estimating equation of the form 
 
  it = (1 – ρ1 – ρ2)[ i
* + α (yt – y
*
t) + β (πt – π
*) ] + ρ1 it–1 + ρ2 it–2 + et   (4) 
 
for the backward-looking specification, which is estimable by nonlinear least squares. The forward-
looking specification replaces πt with π
e
t , and estimation is by the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) using lags of inflation, the output gap, and the call rate as instruments. 
As shown in table 3, the estimates obtained from the backward-looking specification are quite 
sensitive to the choice of output gap measure. Although all the estimates are “reasonable,” in the sense of 
having the correct sign and approximately the right magnitude, they vary a great deal and are very 
imprecisely estimated. The “Taylor Principle” (i.e., β > 1) appears not to hold in two cases, but because 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mechanically following the Taylor rule’s prescription. This restraint may have arisen from the BoJ’s lack of 
independence at the time (the BoJ became independent in April 1998).  
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the output gap term may to some extent capture future inflationary pressures, such an interpretation may 
not be entirely warranted. By contrast, the forward-looking specification consistently yields large, 
significant estimates of β, regardless of which potential output proxy is used; as shown in table 4, all are 
near 2.0. Furthermore, the estimates of the coefficient on the output gap, α, are uniformly small and 
insignificant. Thus, the one conclusion that seems to be robust to choice of output gap proxy is that from 
1986 through 2001, Japanese monetary policy tended to react strongly to inflation but very weakly to the 
output gap.
14 
In general, the results summarized above parallel those of Kozicki (1999), who demonstrated the 
nonrobustness of simple reaction functions’ policy implications in the case of the United States. 
Conclusions drawn from real-time potential output proxies clearly represent a fairer appraisal of policy 
than those based on ex post estimates. But absent a convincing demonstration that one particular output 
gap estimate is superior to the rest, this sort of nonrobustness is surely a generic feature of reaction 
function–based policy appraisals.
15 Even so, it is sometimes argued that reaction functions, such as the 
Taylor rule, can at least be helpful in communicating policymakers’ intentions and providing a 
benchmark for the current policy stance. But even this use of Taylor-style reaction functions is 
problematic in the case of Japan, where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates shifts the emphasis 
of policy from the current interest rate to the expected trajectory of interest rates in the future. This 
limitation of the Taylor rule is the topic of the next section. 
ASSESSING THE STANCE OF EXPECTED POLICY 
As noted above, a deep problem with reaction function analysis is that in it, the stance of monetary policy 
is linked exclusively to the current setting of the short-term nominal interest rate. This approach neglects 
the potentially important impact of the expected future setting of monetary policy. That impact is 
especially important in situations where the current short-term nominal interest rate is constrained, as it is 
in Japan by the zero lower bound, leaving expectations of future policy as a major (if not the only) 
instrument of monetary policy.
16 The potentially central role of expectations has been stressed both in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 The larger output gap coefficient alone does not account for this result: The conclusion is similar (though less 
dramatic) with α = 0.5. 
14 The lack of a measured response to the output gap could be due in part to the zero bound on the interest rate. 
Given this constraint, a tobit equation would be a more appropriate specification for modeling the short-term interest 
rate. 
15 Another critique of the reaction function approach to policy assessment is that it is hard to gauge the optimality of 
the coefficients. A fully specified macro model would in principle provide a more rigorous way of interpreting the 
reaction function coefficients. But this approach would not solve the underlying problem associated with the 
estimation of potential output; if anything, the measurement problems would be compounded by the need to estimate 
(or calibrate) the model’s deep structural parameters. 
16 Other instruments available to the BoJ might include switching the relative shares of different asset classes (or 
maturities of government debt), direct effects of quantitative easing, and the monetization of fiscal policy, though  
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much of the commentary on Japan, such as Krugman (1998) and Blanchard (2000), as well as in recent 
theoretical research, such as Eggertsson (2003) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).  
Our assessment of monetary policy by examining expectations in Japan proceeds initially on two 
independent but ultimately complementary tracks. First, we examine the BoJ’s announced policy actions 
since the mid-1990s (i.e., since approaching the zero bound on the short-term nominal interest rate) in an 
effort to characterize the implications of these announcements for expectations of future policy. Given the 
zero bound and what it implies for the constraint on the BoJ’s instruments but not on its goals, it is 
necessary to identify when the BoJ was affecting expectations without changing short-term rates. Second, 
we attempt to discern from the behavior of long-term interest rates periods in which there appears to have 
been a significant reduction in inflation expectations. We bring together these two strands to determine 
what policy actions (or alternatively inactions in the face of weakening economic conditions) might have 
generated the observed response of long-term interest rates and thereby look for what we term “deflation 
scares,” following Goodfriend (1993). 
 Identifying “Deflation Scares” 
In light of the potentially important impact of policy expectations and the fragility of the reaction function 
approach, there is clearly a need to develop a more forward-looking assessment of policy and one that is 
less susceptible to measurement and estimation error. One way to do this is to glean information from the 
financial markets regarding the perceived impact of monetary policy. 
Goodfriend (1993) provides one example of how this might be done. The idea is to use 
movements in long-term interest rates to discern changes in inflation expectations unrelated to overt 
monetary policy actions. Goodfriend’s analysis focused on “inflation scares.” These are episodes in which 
monetary policy was perceived as too loose, relative to mounting inflationary pressures, resulting in a 
widening yield spread. In the recent Japanese context, the thing to do is turn Goodfriend’s analysis on its 
head and focus instead on “deflation scares” (or, more accurately, “disinflation scares”). These would 
correspond to periods in which monetary policy was viewed as too tight to prevent further disinflation or 
outright deflation, a symptom of which would be a narrowing yield curve. 
Cleanly extracting changes in inflation expectations from the yield curve is problematic, however, 
for the simple reason that the impact of monetary policy on long-term interest rates is ambiguous. For 
example, an increase in short-term interest rates will tend to increase long-term interest rates by 
increasing near-term expectations of future short-term interest rates. But the rate hike will presumably 
also decrease inflation expectations; long-term interest rates may therefore fall if this effect dominates the 
effect on near-term short-term interest rates. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
opinions differ on the efficacy of such instruments. There are also, however, those who dismiss the importance of  
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Goodfriend’s solution to this ambiguity is to look only at periods where long-term interest rates 
rose in an environment of steady or falling short-term interest rates. In this case, the change in long-term 
interest rates would presumably be driven either by inflation expectations or by expectations of an 
impending rate increase. Using a narrative approach, Goodfriend is able to distinguish between these two 
possibilities. The analysis undertaken here is simply a mirror image of Goodfriend’s: The goal is to 
identify periods of falling Japanese government bond (JGB) rates occurring in an environment of a steady 
or rising call rate. Any such change would presumably be driven either by a drop in expected inflation (a 
“deflation scare”) or lower near-term expectations of short-term interest rates. Note that this is a 
statistically driven process, identifying scares independently of the “narrative” events identified by 
historical analysis.  
Japanese Monetary Policy Actions after the Call Rate Approached Zero
17 
How can one discern monetary policy movements as a baseline of potential shocks to inflation 
expectations when the zero lower bound is reached? When the BoJ’s uncollateralized overnight call rate 
remained at a distance from the zero nominal lower-bound, at least the assessment of its stance by Taylor 
rule-type approaches had a place to start. The call rate, however, remained unchanged around 0.50 
percent from September 1995 until September 1998. This period included recovery through fiscal year 
1996, onset of recession in summer 1997, domestic financial breakdowns in autumn 1997, and the effects 
of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, all of which might reasonably have been expected to prompt 
changes in monetary policy, had an interest rate instrument (and transmission mechanism) been readily 
available.
18 While the BoJ did provide several emergency injections of liquidity to the banking system 
during this period, it did not announce or resort to any sustained quantitative or unconventional monetary 
policy measures, nor did it indicate any changes in monetary policy stance. As the vector autoregression 
(VAR) literature on identifying the effects of monetary policy reminds us, though, an unchanging stance 
in the face of changing economic conditions may well signal changes in policy and inflation expectations. 
From September 1998, however, the independent BoJ and its new Policy Board did undertake a 
series of measures, both to change the stance of policy and to expand the range of 
instruments/quantitative measures available to it, in response to economic developments (see table 5).
 19 
At a minimum, we need to know what was attempted to see whether it had any (intended) effect, even in 
the absence of ability to simply insert it into a Taylor rule. On the interest rate side, the overnight call rate 
was reduced in two steps from 0.50 percent to 0.15 percent, raised to 0.25 percent in August 2000, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
expectations in the absence of a restoration of growth (e.g., Friedman 2003). 
17 Samantha Davis provided critical research assistance for the timeline in this section. 
18 The Bank’s lack of legal independence until April 1998 may have played a role in this stability of the instrument 
interest rate.  
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then lowered again in two steps to 0.10 percent between February and September 2001. The Bank also 
created a “Lombard-like” lending facility and lowered the discount rate in order to stimulate use of that 
facility, reaching 0.10 percent in September 2001 as well. Given the ongoing price deflation of this 
period, implying a need for infeasible negative nominal interest rates, however, there is no real way to 
fairly assess such movements on their own terms by means of a Taylor rule estimate. 
The BoJ also undertook several quantitative monetary (as opposed to financial stabilization) 
measures over this period. An ever-broadening range of commercial paper types, eventually to include 
asset- and mortgage-backed securities, were made eligible for repo operations. Similarly, a wider range of 
government securities, ultimately encompassing short-term bills and loans to the government, were made 
eligible for the Bank’s operations. In March 2001, the Policy Board made the current account balances of 
banks at the BoJ the primary target of policy, rather than the then at effective bottom call rate; in February 
2002, the Bank committed to providing liquidity in excess of that target. Monthly outright purchases of 
Japanese government bonds more than tripled to 1.2 trillion yen by October 2002. 
Assessing the content of these moves was made more difficult by repeated references by Policy 
Board members to the likely ineffectiveness of “quantitative measures.”
20 The broadening of assets 
available to the Bank to purchase, as a start on “unconventional measures” was even more unclear in its 
implications. In the first place, if such changes in asset purchases did not change the overall infusion of 
liquidity into the economy, whether or not these would be in fact expansionary was in question.
21 In the 
second place, these measures were explicitly questioned by those undertaking them.
22 
The question relevant to our investigation, therefore, is whether the BoJ policy measures taken 
during this period were perceived as contributing expansionary monetary policy. Specifically, one would 
want to know whether the interest rate, quantitative measures, and broadening of assets available for open 
market operations, undertaken by the BoJ over this period perceived as committing the Bank to (or at 
least signaling) future policy interventions of a sort that would be expected to reduce deflationary 
pressures. 
Three instances merit special scrutiny, occasions on which there seems to have been an explicit 
intention to affect expectations about future interest rates.
23 In a Policy Board meeting on April 9, 1999, 
Governor Hayami and other senior officials turned the call rate cut of February 12, 1999, into the zero-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19 This timeline of BoJ policy was compiled from public releases listed on the Bank’s Web site. 
20 See the references in Kuttner and Posen (2001b) and Posen (2003). 
21 The announcement of the purchase of equities from banks by the BoJ on September 19, 2002, for example, 
prompted an auction undersubscription for JGBs the next day because remarks by the Policy Board were interpreted 
to mean that fewer JGBs would be bought as stocks were purchased. 
22 See the statements by Governor Yukata Yamaguchi, July 3, 2002 (www.boj.or.jp/en/press/02/ko0207b.htm), and 
by BoJ Policy Board Member Teizo Taya, December 20, 2002 (www.boj.or.jp/en/press/02/ko0212b.htm, to cite two 
notable examples. 
23 These announcements are designated on table 3 by bold italics.  
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interest rate policy (ZIRP). They clarified this in a series of speeches over the summer, but the key point 
was made in the minutes of the April 9 meeting, released a month later: “It was important to maintain the 
current decisive easy stance of monetary policy, firmly underpinning economic activity until deflationary 
concerns were dispelled.” This appeared to commit the Bank to a long-term path of ease. On August 11, 
2000, however, the Bank raised the call rate to 0.25 percent, in contradiction of this commitment (and in 
direct contravention of the Ministry of Finance’s request to postpone the interest rate vote), citing “the 
improvement of the economy” without direct reference to deflation. Finally, on March 19, 2001, 
following a reversal of the rate increase, the Policy Board announced that there was a new monetary 
policy strategy that included a commitment that “the new procedure will be kept in place until the CPI 
registers a stable zero percent or increase year on year and should affect people’s expectations in order to 
help reduce the deflationary bias.” 
Six Years of Deflation Scares 
Figure 5 shows the average overnight call money rate and month-end JBG yield from January 1992 to 
March 2003. Up until 1995, all of the major declines in long-term interest rates were accompanied by cuts 
in the overnight rate. But beginning in 1996, five distinct “deflation scare” episodes are evident in the 
data, as highlighted by the shaded areas on the figure: August to November 1996, June to October 1997, 
February to May 1998, September 2000 to February 2001, and March 2002 to the present.
24 
The first three deflation scares take place during the period in which the BoJ’s call rate was not 
moved from 0.50 percent, and also no new quantitative expansion efforts or broadening of assets for 
purchase (except in financial emergencies) were undertaken. The June to October 1997 and February to 
May 1998, scares can be cleanly associated with negative economic shocks (developments in the Asian 
financial crisis, and in the latter case in the Japanese financial system as well) that would have moved 
general economic expectations downwards, while the BoJ took no policy action (during the November 
1997 to January 1998 interregnum, the BoJ was involved in direct financial stabilization measures which 
may have given the appearance of stabilizing the situation and/or being in part monetary expansion). The 
August to November 1996 deflation scare is difficult to associate with any cause, given that it took place 
during a period of economic recovery, with most observers seeing surprises on the upside for inflation 
and growth. Of course, the September 2000 to February 2001 deflation scare fits perfectly with the period 
between the August 11, 2000, increase in the BoJ’s call rate and the February 28, 2001, reversal of that 
increase—the lifting of the ZIRP was seen as deflationary by the markets, as would have been expected 
                                                           
24 Formally, three conditions define the onset of a “deflation scare”: (1) a fall in the current long-term bond yield, (2) 
nonincreasing bond yields in the subsequent three months, and (3) no reductions in the call money rate. The “scare” 
ends when there is either (1) a greater than five basis point increase in the bond yield, or (2) a reduction in the call 
money rate.  
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by most monetary economists, especially since (as noted above) it seemed to invalidate a commitment to 
a future path of looser policy. 
The most recent deflation scare in the sample, from March 2002 to the end of the sample a year 
later, deserves special note, as it is the only such episode to have occurred during the BoJ’s zero interest 
rate policy, as well as the scare being sustained for the longest period. The straightforward interpretation 
is that well-documented and publicized weaknesses in the Japanese banking system, revealed at fiscal 
year-end 2001, increased the perceived likelihood of a debt-deflation spiral, and the BoJ’s quantitative 
measures were discounted as a response.
25  
It is instructive to compare this interpretation with that of Okina and Shiratsuka (2003), who 
characterize the episode as one in which the expected duration of the prevailing ZIRP was increasing, 
while the expected overall level of interest rates in the distant future was falling. Thus, the BoJ’s stated 
policy of maintaining a zero interest rate “until deflationary pressures have subsided” means that as the 
economy weakened, the date of any future interest rate increases was deferred, and this accounts for the 
observed fall in long-term interest rates.  
Although this might appear to contradict the episode’s designation as a “deflation scare,” the two 
interpretations are in fact consistent. The reason is that the appropriate policy response to weakening 
economic conditions would be a further reduction in the real interest rate; with the short-term interest rate 
constrained at zero, the only way to do this is to increase inflation expectations.
26 Thus, a policy that, in 
the face of intensifying deflationary pressure, commits only to bring the inflation rate back up to zero, is 
insufficiently expansionary—particularly against a backdrop of falling asset prices, banking system 
distress, and a fiscal situation often characterized by government officials as unsustainable. This 
interpretation is corroborated by Okina and Shiratsuka’s (2003) finding that long-horizon expectations of 
the short-term nominal interest rate also fell over this period. 
CONCLUSIONS: WHAT TAYLOR RULES DO AND DO NOT TELL US ABOUT JAPAN  
We have considered two issues regarding the applicability and informativeness of Taylor rules as a means 
of monetary policy assessment in the low-inflation environment of Japan’s Great Recession. First, we 
addressed the difficulties presented by uncertainty over potential output in Japan. A wide variety of 
approaches were undertaken by previous investigators to estimate potential output for use in Taylor rule 
assessments of Japanese monetary policy, and these have resulted in a wide spread of assessments, as we 
document. Given the real (substantive and statistical) reasons for uncertainty about Japanese potential 
                                                           
25 See Posen (2002, 2003) for discussions of this period and the apparent evidence for incipient debt-deflation. 
26 This idea has been elegantly formalized in a recent paper by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). In their model, the 
optimal policy rule is related to a price level target and requires a commitment to a higher level of future inflation 
(or at least a longer period of above-target inflation) the longer the nominal interest rate remains constrained. Such a  
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output over this period, we argue that these account for the major divergences in ex post evaluations of 
BoJ monetary policy. Our conclusion is that while one can argue that there is a preferable means of 
estimating potential output for this purpose,
27 that argument is hardly settled, and even after picking any 
one method there remains great uncertainty, sufficient to render the Taylor rule assessments of Japanese 
monetary policy unreliable.  
We then considered the communication of future commitments about the course of interest rates 
through the BoJ’s quantitative and unconventional measures since the nominal interest rate neared zero. 
Our assessment of the impact of developments in the current stance and approach of Japanese monetary 
policy on expectations begins with a timeline of those developments drawn up from official releases by 
the BoJ. We find that in Japan deflation scares have occurred five times since 1996, notably prompted by 
an interest rate increase in August 2000 that reversed a commitment to a future ZIRP until deflationary 
concerns would be dispelled, and one that persisted through much of 2002 seemingly associated with the 
BoJ’s public pronouncements regarding deflation and the inefficacy of monetary policy. Consistent with 
the evidence in Kuttner and Posen (2001b) and some a priori arguments made by the BoJ, we find no 
evidence that the various quantitative measures and expansions of eligible assets for open market 
operations undertaken by the BoJ over this period had an impact on long-term bond yields. The reason, 
presumably, is that these measures are not expected to have a significant impact either on the future path 
of the policy rate or on inflation.  
Taking ex post Taylor rule evaluation of monetary policy at face value of course ignores a vast 
range of issues in the monetary policy challenge in Japan at present—a partial list would also include the 
asymmetries of deflation versus low inflation, the transmission mechanism breakdowns in the financial 
system, the economic and political interactions between monetary policy and financial reform, and the 
external effects and constraints of any exchange rate movements for the yen. It also ignores broader 
normative approaches to evaluating the welfare of any given monetary policy. In a sense, this is precisely 
the point of this paper—that monetary policy evaluation cannot be done by rote rules any more than 
policymaking can.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
policy rule is said to be “history dependent.” 
27 One method particularly well-suited to this sort of application is that of Kuttner (1994), applied with 
modifications to Japan in Posen (1998) and Kuttner and Posen (2001b). REFERENCES 
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a. Estimated through 1986, projected thereafter. 
 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the conventional (0.05) level. For those studies that estimated both forward- and backward-looking reaction 
functions, the coefficients from the forward-looking equations are displayed.  
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Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999) 
 
1988–90, too loose; 1992–96, too tight. 
 
Ahearne et al. (2002) 
 
Using real-time inflation forecasts, BoJ response was in line with estimated reaction 
function. 
 
Kuttner and Posen 
(2001) 
 
No comparison of actual versus prescribed policy. 
 
Jinushi, Kuroki, and 
Miyao (2000) 
 
1987–91, too loose; 1992–96, too tight. 
 
Calderwood and 
Matsuoka (2000)  
 
1989–93, too loose; 1994–96, too tight. 
 
Okina and Shiratsuka 
(2002) 
 
BoJ response in line with backward-looking reaction function throughout; slow to react 








Consistently too tight from 1982 to 1991, about right in 1992, and too tight again from 








1989–91, too loose; 1991–94, about right; 1994–96, too tight.  
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Table 3 Estimates of Backward-Looking Reaction Functions for Alternative Estimates of 















































































































Notes: Sample period is 1986Q1 through 2001Q1. The results are based on an equation of the form it = (1 – ρ1 –
 ρ2)[r
* + (1 – β) π
* + β πt + α (yt – yt
*)] + ρ1 rt–1 + ρ2 rt–2 , where it is the call money rate, πt is CPI inflation (adjusted 
for changes in the consumption tax) over the preceding four quarters, and yt – yt
* is an estimate of the output gap. 
For the purpose of estimating the equilibrium real rate of interest, r
*, the desired inflation rate, π
* is set to 1.0. The 
equation is estimated using OLS. Parentheses contain standard errors, corrected for third-order serial correlation.  
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Table 4  Estimates of Forward-Looking Reaction Functions for Alternative Estimates of 















































































































Notes: Sample period is 1986Q1 through 2001Q1. The results are based on an equation of the form rt = (1 – ρ1 –
 ρ2)[r
* + (1 – β) π
* + β πt+4 + α (yt – yt
*)] + ρ1 rt–1 + ρ2 rt–2 , where rt is the call money rate, πt+4 is CPI inflation 
(adjusted for changes in the consumption tax) over the next four quarters, and yt – yt
* is an estimate of the output 
gap. For the purpose of estimating the equilibrium real rate of interest, r
*, the desired inflation rate, π
* is set to 1.0. 
The equation is estimated using GMM, using two lags of inflation, two lags of the output gap, and the lagged call 
rate as instruments. Parentheses contain standard errors, corrected for third-order serial correlation.  
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Table 5  Monetary Policy Developments in Japan Since Approaching the Zero Nominal-Interest 
Bound 
 









Reduced call rate to 0.25 percent  Yes   
November 13, 
1998 
Expanded size and scope of commercial paper 




Established “temporary lending facility” to 








May 18, 1999  Released minutes of April 9, 1999, Monetary 
Policy Meeting announcing decision “it was 
important to maintain the current decisive 
easy stance of monetary policy, firmly 
underpinning economic activity until 
deflationary concerns were dispelled.” 
b 
  
October 13, 1999  Introduced outright operations using short-
term government securities, expanded range of 
government securities for repos 
 Yes 
August 11, 2000  Raised call rate to 0.25 percent, contradicting 
ZIRP in light of government forecasts 
Yes  
February 9, 2001  Introduced “Lombard-type” facility; reduced 




Reduced call rate to 0.15 percent; reduced 
discount rate to 0.25 percent next day 
Yes  
March 19, 2001  Changed main operating target to outstanding 
balance of current accounts at the BoJ instead 
of call rate; Stated that “the new procedure 
will be kept in place until the CPI registers a 
stable zero percent or increase year-on-
year” 
c 
No: “The Bank 










May 18, 2001  Extended the maturity date for bills purchased 
from 3 to 6 months 
 Yes 
August 14, 2001  Increased guideline for money market 
operations from 5 to 6 trillion yen; increased 
outright purchase of long-term government 
Yes   










Reduced discount rate to 0.10 percent  Yes   
December 19, 
2001 
Increased target outstanding balance of current 
accounts to a 10-15 trillion yen range; 
increased outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds from 600 billion to 800 
billion yen per month 
Yes Yes 
January 16, 2002  Enhanced CP repos including extension to 
asset-backed CP; expanded range of 




Increased guideline for liquidity provision to 
market beyond the current account balance 
(CAB) target; increased outright purchase of 
long-term government bonds to 1 trillion yen 
per month 
Yes Yes 
March 20, 2002  Expanded range of eligible collateral for repos 
to include mortgage-backed securities and 
loans to the government and Deposit 




Introduced operations in “outright purchase of 
(government) bills”; offered to buy up to 2 
trillion yen in equities held by the banking 
system 
 Yes 
October 30, 2002  Increased CAB target to 15-20 trillion yen; 
increased outright purchases of government 




Relaxed standards on collateral from deeds 
and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
 Yes 
 
a. It was on this date that the BoJ initiated the zero-interest rate policy, which was set up based on a new guideline 
for money market operations: “The Bank of Japan will provide more ample funds and encourage the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate to move as low as possible.” 
b. For details, see www.boj.or.jp/en/seisaku/99/pb/g990409.htm.  
c.  See www.boj.or.jp/en/seisaku/01/pb/k010319b.htm. 
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Notes: The reaction function used is ĩt = 5 + 1.5×(πt – 2) + 0.5×(yt – yt
*), where πt is the four-quarter CPI inflation 
rate (adjusted for changes in the consumption tax), and yt – yt
* is an estimate of the output gap. All variables are 
measured in percentage terms.  
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Notes: The reaction function used is ĩt = i0 + β πt
e + α (yt – yt
*), where yt – yt
* is an estimate of the output gap, and πt
e 
is a forecast of the four-quarter CPI inflation rate (adjusted for changes in the consumption tax) based on two lags of 
inflation and the same estimate of the output gap. The parameter values chosen correspond to the baseline Volcker-
Greenspan estimates in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000): β = 2.15 and α = 0.93. All variables are measured in 
percentage terms.   30  
Figure 5 “Deflation Scares,” 1992–2002 
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